The Great Greek Revolt Against Macedonia After Alexander’s Death

More than a decade after Greek freedom was said to have died at the hands of the Macedonians at the Battle of Chaeronea (338 BCE), a new Greek alliance challenged Macedonian dominance. A Greek revolt was triggered by events shortly before Alexander the Great’s death in 323 BCE, which gave the Greeks hope. The subsequent Lamian War (323-322 BCE) saw an Athenian-led Greek alliance fighting to free Greece from Macedonia, which had reached new heights of power and wealth. For a few months, the fate of the Greek cities hung in the balance as a series of closely fought battles raged across land and sea.

Alexander the Great and his father, Philip II, dominated rather than conquered Greece. Victory over Athens and Thebes in 338 BCE, the total destruction of Thebes in 335 BCE, and the defeat of a Spartan-led revolt in 331 BCE ensured calm while Alexander conquered the Persian Empire. The regent Antipater successfully maintained this calm in Alexander’s absence. However, late in Alexander’s reign, a number of incidents disturbed the peace.

In 324 BCE, an unexpected visitor arrived at Athens. Once a close companion of Alexander, Harpalus had fled accusations of financial mismanagement and came to Greece with a substantial amount of cash and mercenaries. Accepting the windfall and the fugitive would certainly mean war. Demosthenes, a prominent Athenian politician, was a famous opponent of Macedonia, but he was not foolish. He called for restraint, and ultimately, the Athenians sent Harpalus away. Though Harpalus soon died in Crete, Demosthenes was accused of taking some of the money and was exiled. A war over Harpalus was avoided, but the uneasy peace had been disturbed, and the Athenians had quietly started using his funds to hire mercenaries (Bosworth, 2006, 857).

For two communities in particular, there was special reason to worry about the Exile’s Decree. The Aetolians in central Greece had seized the land of the nearby city of Oeniadae, while the Athenians had long held the island of Samos, the last remaining piece of a former Aegean Empire. Both would have to surrender these prize possessions. Neither was willing to do so.

The Exile’s Decree provided the motive for revolt. The money and mercenaries floating around following Alexander’s wars provided the means. Then, in the summer of 323 BCE, the news of Alexander’s death presented the opportunity.

The cautious Athenian preparations moved into the open. Leosthenes, an Athenian general, stepped up the recruitment of mercenaries and became central to the early phases of the war. Though still exiled, Demosthenes toured the cities of Greece, building support for the war. Many Greek states joined the alliance built around the Athenians and the Aitolians.

Having kept out of previous revolts against Macedonia, Athens was well-prepared for war. Athenian finances were reorganized in the 330s under the watch of Lycurgus, allowing for a lavish building program in the city and the reconstruction of the Athenian fleet and military training. By 323 BCE, Athens boasted a fleet of almost 400 triremes and 50 of the larger quadriremes (Bosworth, 2006, 851). However, this renewed strength was untested. The last major Athenian campaign had been 15 years earlier, and it was a quick defeat.

History refers to the coming war as the Lamian War since the action focused on the central Greek town of Lamia. However, for the Greeks, the war had a grander name: the Hellenic War, which was the war to liberate the Greeks (the Hellenes). The extent to which the rest of the Greeks saw the war as a fight for their freedom versus an Athenian and Aitolian-led reaction to the Exile’s Decree, is uncertain.

In 323 BCE, the war started well. Leosthenes defeated the Boiotians, who had refused to join the alliance, and continued north to confront Antipater. Once in central Greece, a new opportunity presented itself. Immediately south of Macedonia is Thessaly, a large, flat region renowned for excellent horses. It was home to the Thessalian cavalry, a key part of the Macedonian war machine. But, they defected and joined Leosthenes. With these powerful new allies, Leosthenes defeated Antipater and drove him into Lamia. Antipater had already called to the Macedonian generals in Asia for aid, but for now, he was outnumbered and trapped.

Unfortunately, our information on the Lamian War is limited and not necessarily reliable. Our main source is the 1st-century BCE historian Diodorus, whose brief account leaves much unanswered. Historians have frequently believed he almost entirely skipped the decisive theater of the war. Within his account are a few short lines informing us that the Athenians lost a series of naval battles, but the details and chronology are unclear.

Using a few scattered references and inscriptions, historians have pieced together a plausible account of the war at sea. This suggests that the Athenian navy lost battles at the Hellespont, eastern or western Greece, and finally, in the central Aegean, off the island of Amorgos. These bare facts suggest a possible strategy. Perhaps the Athenians were in the Hellespont to prevent Macedonian reinforcements from crossing from Asia to Europe. If that was the case, their failure was critical to the war. The logic behind the battle at Amorgos is less clear, but another defeat seems to confirm that the Athenians lost control of the sea.

Despite the limited information, there is a widely held view that the Greeks lost the war at sea (O’Sullivan, 2024, 23). However, it is possible to challenge this view as the supposed Athenian strategy is logical but only a hypothesis. Given Macedonian control of both the European and Asian shores, the Athenian fleet would have had difficulty operating in the area.

As far as we can tell, the Athenians did not suffer major casualties in their defeats, but despite a significant pre-war rebuilding of the navy, the Athenians could not recapture their former command of the sea. Ships could be rebuilt, but the experienced sailors and commanders who turned them into effective weapons seem to have been lost to Athens after decades of declining power.

After Leosthenes’ initial success, the war went against the Greeks around Lamia. Antipater was trapped behind Lamia’s walls but refused to surrender and waited for aid. Leosthenes tried to end the war quickly but could not break through the city’s defenses. In one skirmish outside, Lamia Leosthenes was killed, removing one of the Greeks’ principal leaders.

Competent replacements for Leosthenes were found in the Athenian Antiphilus and the Thessalian Menon, but they soon faced a new challenge. With the siege of Lamia and the campaigning season dragging on, part of the Greek army left for home. The Aetolians may have had to withdraw to confront another Macedonian front. Meanwhile, Macedonian reinforcements from Asia finally arrived. Around 20,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry were heading toward Lamia under Leonnatus, a former close companion of Alexander the Great and amongst his most prominent successors.

Abandoning the unsuccessful siege of Lamia, the Greeks moved to confront Leonnatus. Antiphilus and Menon were slightly outnumbered, but the Thessalian cavalry decided the battle. The Thessalians drove Leonnatus onto some marshy ground, defeating his cavalry and killing Leonnatus himself. It was a considerable triumph for the Greeks, but as they defeated Leonnatus, Antipater slipped out of Lamia. Linking up with the infantry of Leonnatus’ army, which had not fought in the battle, Antipater suddenly had the reinforcements he desperately needed.

The news got worse for the Greeks as 322 BCE progressed. Craterus, another of Alexander’s veteran generals, arrived in Macedonia with another wave of reinforcements. The Greeks, on the other hand, were struggling to bring their forces together as the different contingents of the Greek alliance were slow in returning to the army. This points to a disadvantage the Greek cities and federal states had against the Macedonians. While mercenaries had become major parts of Greek armies, most states still operated as citizen militias, which could not be away from home for prolonged periods. In contrast, the Macedonian army was closer to a professional force, making it easier for the kings and warlords to call up and maintain large forces.

Antipater and Craterus now commanded 40,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry. Part of Craterus’ force were veterans of Alexander’s campaigns, some of the most experienced fighters in the world. Antiphilus and Menon waited as long as possible for reinforcements but were ultimately outnumbered, with 25,000 infantry and 3,500 cavalry (Diodorus, 18.17.3-5).

In the late summer of 322 BCE, these two uneven armies clashed at the Battle of Crannon in Thessaly. The main Greek hope lay in the Thessalians winning the cavalry battle on the flat plain and tipping the balance against the infantry. The plan came close to working as the Thessalians started to win their battle. When Antipater saw how the day was going, he rushed to bring his phalanx into the fight and met the Greek infantry head-on. The numbers and quality of the Macedonian phalanx gradually overwhelmed as they pushed the Greeks back. The Greeks were forced back, but they did not break and managed to retreat to some high ground, where they halted the Macedonian advance.

The Greeks had the worst of the fighting, losing 500 men compared to 130 Macedonians (Diodorus, 18.17.5). However, the battle was far from decisive. The Greeks still hoped reinforcements would allow them to resume the conflict and entered into discussions over a truce. Seeking to divide their enemy, Antipater and Craterus refused to negotiate with the full Greek alliance, insisting on talking to each state separately.

While this stalemate continued, the Macedonians started recapturing the rebellious Thessalian cities. With the Greek army not strong enough to stop them, Antipater and Craterus retook the cities one by one. The Greek alliance now quickly fell apart. Individual cities looked for the best terms they could and, to speed up the process, Antipater was generous. The Greeks had not been crushed, but they could not win the war. Deserted by their allies and exposed to invasion, the Athenians also surrendered.

Antipater’s terms were devastating. A Macedonian garrison occupied Piraeus, the base of the Athenian fleet. Anti-Macedonian leaders in Athens were to be surrendered. One politician, Hypereides, was tracked down and executed. Demosthenes, having been triumphantly allowed back into Athens during the war, had to flee again. Macedonian agents pursued him to the sanctuary of Poseidon on the island of Poros. After decades of trying to rally the Greeks to resist the growing power of Macedonia, Demosthenes took poison and died before being handed over to Antipater. Worse, democracy itself was now at an end. Wealth qualifications were brought in, disenfranchising the Athenian lower classes and transforming the state into an oligarchy (Worthington, 2021, 27). Athens would never again be a major power.

The severe consequences of the Athenian defeat seem out of place with the often indecisive nature of the fighting in this short war. Following some early victories, the Greek alliance crumbled rapidly after some far-from-crushing defeats at Amorgos and Crannon. There seems to be more to the defeat than military factors.

Diodorus mentions that even in Athens, support for the war was divided, with the lower classes eager while the wealthy were reluctant (Diodorus, 18.10). This type of comment is common amongst ancient historians who, being drawn from the elite themselves, were often happy to blame democracy for failures. But there were real divisions in Athens. Whilst the exiled Demosthenes toured Greece, building alliances, other Athenian leaders had left the city to take the opposite line and defend Macedonia (Plutarch, Demosthenes, 27.2).

The decisive factor in the campaign in Thessaly was that several Greek contingents did not return to continue the battle. This limited participation and the swift disintegration of the alliance suggests many states choose peace at the first opportunity. In this sense, the war looks just as much of a diplomatic as a military defeat (O’Sullivan, 2024, 35). Perhaps too many Greek cities looked at Athens and the Aetolians and saw them fighting a war to hold onto their territories rather than a committed fight for Greek freedom.

Given that they were fighting the greatest empire of its day, the Greeks only had a narrow path to victory. Had they overwhelmed Antipater in 323 BCE, they may have secured temporary freedom from the Macedonians whilst the successors of Alexander fought amongst themselves. However, Antipater’s determined defense of Lamia meant the war would continue, and once that was clear, the weight of Macedonian power guaranteed only one outcome.

Bibliography

Chaniotis, A. (2018). The Age of Conquests: The Greek World from Alexander to Hadrian. Harvard University Press.

Worthington, I (2021). Athens after Empire: A History from Alexander the Great to the Emperor Hadrian. Oxford University Press.

O’Sullivan, L. (2024). “The Athenian naval campaign and the failure of the Lamian War: a re-evaluation.” Ancient History Bulletin 38.1-2. 23-41

Bosworth, A.B (2006). “Alexander the Great Parts 2: Greece and the Conquered Territories.”  The Cambridge Ancient History. Volume 4: The Fourth Century. ed. Lewis, D.M., et al. 846-875. Cambridge University Press.